



AND STATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA:
FROM CHARISMA TO BUREAUCRACY
Jon G. Âbbink
It is likely that thé majonty of rural people in Sub-Saharan Africa live
in societies with some form of indigenous political structures It is
therefore relevant to inquire into thé nature and prospects of thèse
forms of political authority in an era when states are in crisis and
governance is precarious. What intermediate rôles do thèse structures,
for instance chiefs, fulfill in African political life, and how do they
form the framework for thé construction of authority and legitimacy? It
is remarkable that in thé debates on African 'democratization
processes' (e.g., Ake 1996; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Glickman
1996; Joseph 1997; Ottaway 1997), few références are made to the
rôles of indigenous structures and chiefs There almost seem to be two
différent discourses on African politics, one led by political scientists
and law scholars, another by historians and anthropologists; and it is
time to reconnect.
Specifically thé debates on local leaders and chieftaincy in Africa
reveal a few recurring thèmes:
(a) the high measure of 'constructedness' of chieftaincy in
contexts of colonial and postcolonial state rule;
(b) the ambiguous, contested rôle of chiefs in modem
bureaucratie settings, where they stand with one leg in
'tradition' (or, perhaps better in convention) and with thé
other in the state administration that attempts to co-opt them;
(c) their tenuous connection with cultural traditions;
(d) their alleged potential for community empowerment in thé
processes of political liberalization that hâve marked Africa
since about 1989.
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strong foothold in local society and were accountable to their people.
Indeed, if they became too populär they were removed. Their loyalty
only had to be upward: towards the emperor and his political circle. In
fact, a deep-rooted patrimonial structure of personal ties and loyalties
was in place: a seemingly 'rational', modernizing structure remained
caught in a political culture of traditional authoritarianism.*
In the Derg era, the revolutionary state from 1974-91, this
authoritarian pattern was much reinforced, and wherever traditional
chiefs existed they were violently removed and suppressed in a
concerted effort to undermine the so-called 'backward' socio-cultural
fabricsand class structure of rural Ethiopia. Indigenous 'customary law'
traditions were not recognized in the state courts, except perhaps at the
lowest, more informal level (the local judge court, or atbiya dagna; see
Aberra 2000, 221).
In the empirical sections of this paper I show that the above three
forms of authority co-exist and interact until this day and define much
of the local political dynamics, including violent conflict. Rethinking
governance and democratization in Ethiopia, with a government
claiming to bring a new democratie empowerment to all 'nationalities'
(ethnie groups),6 means not bypassing the indigenous structures of
decision-making and -identity formation that partly define people's
outlook and commitments.
Three Views
I start with three contemporary local views on history and authority by
leaders from three ethnie groups in the area under discussion (see Map
I), with my comments in brackets.
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Map 1. Southwest Ethiopia
Location of mam ethnie groups, villages, woreda
boundanes and administrative centers (1998) 50 KM
A Dizi chtef:
"When thé Amhara came to our area [with thé conquest in 1898], in thé
time of my grandfather, we Dizi were big men. We had strong chiefs
fighting each other and leading our areas with strong hand and justice.
These people were also tall and hairy people, more healthy and
physically strenger than we are now. They had large families, many
retainers, many cattle. You see the valley down there where the Suri are
now? All that area was ours: it was our pasture and bee-keeping area.
Have you seen the old field walls and ditches in the lowlands near
Turn? They were made by our ancestors for cultivating sorghum and
t'eff[i\vo indigenous grains]. My grandfather had many people working
for him and giving him yearly produce. The coming of Ras Wolde
Giorgis' people [the genera! leading the conquest] changed all that. We
were destroyed by the gabbar [labour serf] System and enslaved. Do
you know how many men and girls were taken away in slavery? How
many men had to work as gàbbar for Atse Menilik's soldiers and for
the Maji people? You heard of these katama [fortified village built by
the soldiers] people and of administrators like Dejazmach Birru [Haile-
Mariam], a big oppressor of the Dizi, and of Dejazmach Mengesha
Yilma [in the early days of Haile Sellassie's reign, in 1930-32)? He
exploited the Dizi and oppressed them hard, in alliance with the
neft'ennyotch [armed settlers in Maji village]. Let God bring them to
justice. We were not treated as people; we lost our dignity. Our people
became also sick and succumbed to unknown diseases.
Though my grandfather and father were respected by the Amhara
and the government, they lost their power to rule. We Dizi went down,
and up to now have not recovered. In the Derg time [1974-91] things
became worse. They brought guns al! over the place and ruled with
violence. They stole our chiefly insignia and forced us to eat sorghum.
(...) So far under Ehadig [= EPRDF, the current government] there is
not much improvement. As you know our people are robbed and killed
by the Surma all the time. l am a chief but l cannot enforce anything."




"We Chai [a sub-section of the Suri], we are reigned by the Buffaloes
[i.e., the âge grade of elders, called 'Buffaloes']. Golach [a Suri and
Me'en name for the northern immigrants] and Italians were hère, but
none of them were our bosses. We have paid taxes and go to markets to
buy and seil, but we have our law. The country is ours.
l am the Chai komoru [ritual mediator] and I take care of the
peace. Do you see the sky, with God, up there? Do you also see the
earth here, with the village, the people? I am between them; I must take
care that they come together. [Pointing to the ground] It is mine ....
Rain must be brought forth; God must be listened to. Ehadig lias corne
and put the Surma Council here. Let these people do their job, l wil! do
mine."
- Londosa (Ngatulul) Dollote V, komoru of the Chai Suri, in
Komm, Surma district, February 1992.
A Me 'en leader:
"We Me'en never succumbed to the Golach. When they came to this
area, before the time of the Italians, we were living here. We had many
small villages and we herded cattle. They took a lot of cattle from us,
and also raided children and women. They wanted people to work for
them like slaves. But they never caught our leaders, like Ngorba or
Gelezjba or Katila and his son Kwomoda, who fought them till their
death. Jemu village was never safe from us. Shasha the same. We also
controlled the routes of Maji. The rulers of the Golach sat in the
villages; we had no Golach chiefs among us. But they did damage to us
with their soldiers. We could not work in the fields and herd cattle
without fear; we cotiid not send women and children to markets,
because we could not be sure that they all would return. At that time,
the village people [i.e., the northern immigrants in the highland market
villages] really were our enemies and we fought them, with rifles that
we had acquired from them by trade or capture. We did not respect
their chiefs and never went to them to help solve our problems. We
were judged and guided by our komoruts [ritual leaders]. In later years
we learned more how to live together. [ ] Now we have more
problems with people like the Surma. We are more divided, and no
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longer have strong leaders."
- Kenyazmach Gauli, a leader of the Bayti Me'en, Kella area, Me'en
région, February 1988.
Thèse are three contemporary reflections on power and leadership
from three of thé minority groups discussed in this study: the Dizi, the
Suri and thé Me'en, The fragments show a memory of rivalry and of
contested power. They reveal oppositions between locally existing
forms of governance and the structures of a conquering or imposée!
state that are still relevant today. The statements also indicate that thé
speakers continue to attach value to their own cultural tradition, shaped
before thé northern conquest, thé Italian occupation or thé pénétration
of the modem state. As leaders, they dérive continued legitimacy and
acceptance among their people, like their predecessors. From a survey
and interviews with thé common people of thèse three ethnie groups it
appeared that they were recognized and complied with, up to a point.
The ritual functions that thé leaders/chiefs perform are valued and they
are still seen as focal points in community life and figure in people's
new conception of group identity.
None of thèse leaders (or their predecessors) became officially
recognized 'chiefs' with légal powers and administrative functions
under Ethiopian state law. They were left to arbitrale in thé domain of
'custom' and played no political rôle except as local rebels in moments
of state crisis (See below). What then was the background of the
Ethiopian state discouraging the récognition or formation of local
'chiefs'?
Ethiopia: Diversity in Cultural Traditions and Customary Law
Since thé fourth Century BCE, Ethiopia knew an evolving tradition of
central impérial control: a monarchy expanding from thé northern
highlands set thé tone for a political tradition of hierarchical rule and
thé building of central state institutions and a symbolism, buttressed by
the Orthodox Christian faith. However, throughout thé country's long
history, this impérial tradition articulated with other societies and
political Systems. A process of fusion and often violent expansion
proceeded for hundreds of years. In matiy régions, rival smatler-scale
states emerged; in others thé local polities continued existing, both
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forms in a tributary relation with thé emperor. A show of political
loyalty was usually enough, as massive assimilation was not the aim of
state policy. Only under Emperor Haile Selassie was there a more
forced emphasis on cultural and linguistic homogen ization, at least as
far as official public life was concerned: the éducation system, the
army, the courts and higher political functions demanded
'Amharization', adopting the language and the cultural style of the
Amhara dominant group. This led to disparities and discontent, and,
combined with material and political concerns, contributed to the
émergence of ethno-regional revolts. (Gebru 1991)
For most of its history Ethiopia had varying borders and was a
loose fédération of culturally and linguistically diverse groups which
now traded and then fought with each other. The varying indigenous
law traditions survived until this day. (cf. Aberra 1998, 34f) One
important point is the absence in Ethiopia of a Western colonial legacy
in politics and law.8 The 'indirect rule' model, as we know it from
Central and West Africa, was not applied: subjects were either directly
under the emperor, or were loyal to their regional chiefs and lords who
had nominal accountability to the emperor. Most importantly, there was
no cultural or colour divide as in the case of Western colonialism.
In the régions incorporated since the late nineteenth Century, pre-
existing forms of governance and authority included segmentary
societies (Somali), âge-grade societies in the east and south (Oromo,
Konso, Darasa, Sidama), 'divine' kingdoms (Wolayta, Maale, Oida),
democratie assembly-socieities (Gamo), and hierarchical chiefdoms in
the central and southern régions (Aari, Bench, Dizi). These Systems
differed in their extent of centralization, horizontal vs. vertical political
communication, their conceptions of 'authority' of persons or groups,
and in their political économies. This diversity of polities, enhanced by
major language différences, posed a challenge for the centralizing
Ethiopian empire-state and its twentieth-century modernization project.
As evident from the often violent conquest of southern régions
(Arsi, Wolayta, Harar), the process of grounding impérial power and
legitimacy was seriously contested, especially when local people
violently resisted. In the process, indigenous structures of governance
were often destroyed, and hereditary chiefs or kings were initially
removed or replaced with direct appointées from the centre
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(appointment of military chiefs as governors). Their rule was based on
the control of resources and local labour power. This was the gäbbar
System: every northern soldier, settler or administrator received a
number of local people as his gàbbars or tributary retainers, labour-
serfs who had to work on his land, fetch fuel wood, do maintenance
work, deliver tribute in kind, etc. This system was a heavy bürden on
the local population, crippling their own productive capacity. It led to
abuse, over-exploitation and impoverishment.
Alongside this first layer of control, a second one was allowed to
exist: that of local, indigenous représentatives. These people were of
low rank, placed under the governor or district administrator, and acted
as liaison men for their own society. Under the ancient régime up to
1974 there were several of such positions, two of which are important
in the région to be discussed: the balabbat and the chiqa-shum?
The balabbat (in Amharic: 'one who has a father', i.e. a
recognised genealogy indicating status as a 'big man') was the
legitimate claimant ör owner of a certain territory, and confirmed in his
position by the administrators. He could be a clan elder, a spirit-healer,
a ritual leader, or a traditional chief or king of a certain ethnie group.
Later the word simply came to mean 'big man' or leading, wealthy
figure in the local Community, i.e. also outside the ethnie group in
question. For instance, in the Maji area there were even several Amhara
balabbats who had assimilated to local society, although they stood
above it in rank or cultural prestige. In the government structure, the
balabbat had no legally well-defined administrative tasks, but he was
held responsible for order and for the political compliance of the local
Community. He often became more dependent on the central authorities
than on his own Community, thus losing local cultural legitimacy.
The chiqa-shum ('mud chief) was a government-confirmed chief
of a rural area or a village (nominally under the balabbat). While
having no military or judicial powers, these chiefs were officially to
keep law and order, organize collective works, allocate of land, and
communicate government laws and directives to the rural populace
(Berhane 1969, 38). Although the iricumbents got this position either
by inheritance, by nomination or by élection within the local
Community (Berhane 1969, 36), the balabbat-appo'mtment was not
always a logical extension of the local leadership pattern based on
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indigenous socio-cultural rankiftg.
Hence, local leaders or chiefs from an ethnie or regional group
were at most government liaison men10 ünder rnore powerful, direct
appointées of the Emperor. The empire state looked for hydlty in
leaders, and if töcal elite figures were pliant they remaified m place and
could even amass wealth, e.g., as' land owners. If deemed unreliable
they were ignored or relegated to the symbolic realm, whilé others,
with a feeble prestige or legitimacy basis, were-appointed. It must be
said, however, that after the conquests, Emperor- Menilik II (1889-
1913) and Empress Zewditu (1916-1930)" tried as much as possible to
appeal to the coopération of regional lords and traditional leaders, and
did not resort to force each time there were différences of opinion.
However, the cultural articulation of these two traditions of
authority and leadership - the central and the local - remained complex
and varied across groups. There was both continuity and rupture in
local leadership (see Donham 1986, 37). This can also be seen in the
case of three groups discussed here: the Dizi, the Suri and the Me'en.
These are small-scale societies, varying in population (from about
26,000 to 28,000 for Dizi and Söri to 70,000 (for Me'en), in language
and a social organization, but united in their economie and political
marginality at the south-western fringes of Ethiopia. Their area (Maji)
was long seen by highland Ethiopians as a place of exile (Hodson 1929;
Garretson 1986). Marginality meant exclusion from the centres of
power, economie exploitation and cultural inferiority.
Power in Ethiopia: Southern Chiefs between Empire and Local
Governance up to 1974
*We saw that in imperia! Ethiopia, and especially in the conquered
South, local leaders structurally remained on the sideltnes of power.
While an integrative project of centralist national development was
instigated by Emperor Haile Selassie after World War II, hè sought to
achieve this by means of administrators and soldiers from the highland
areas; customary law and local political traditions had little place in
this. Nevertheless, there was no wholesale delegitimization of the ritual
power and prestige of traditional leaders and chiefs in their own
society: the enactment, of culturally relevant ceremonies and rites,
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dispute médiation, divination, etc., though seen as backward, was not
prohibited or suppressed.
The Emperor's ambitious project of reforming and codifying law
with the help of foreign advisors led to the promulgation of new
modern law codes (such as the Pénal Code, the Civil Code, the
Criminal Procedure Code and the Maritime Code), developed on the
basic principles of Romano-Germanic law (See Aberra 1998, 9-10),
However, especially in the rural areas, the impact of codification of law
was limited, despite Article 3347(1) of the 1960 Civil Code, which
said: "Unless otherwise expressly providedr all rules whether written or
not of customary law previously in force concerning matters provided
for in this Code shall be replaced by this Code and are hereby repealed"
(Cited in Aberra 1998, 13). The point is that there were many matters in
customary law that were not dealt with in the Code and that continued
to be arbitrated according to the customary rules of the ethnie group or
région involved. This especially applied to the southern régions that
missed the deep-rooted tradition of court litigation known in the
Amharic and Tigrinya-speakingNorth. In addition, the national judicial
infrastructure was underdeveloped and of bad quality. As courts and
judges were known to take bribes and justice in the true sense of the
term was not to be had, most people only went there if all other efforts
had failed. Obviously, in the Codes (drafted by foreign experts), there
was no référence to traditional authorities such as chiefs.
Hence, the initial ambitions of national reform and renewal were
high, but the imperia! state did not succeed in delivering the goods,
bogged down as it was in authoritarianism, excessive centralism and
stagnant, unequal system of land distribution. In practice, in conditions
where the state could not or did not reach the people, local leaders were
often co-opted mto the system, though without forma! powers. They
could adjudicate according to the local 'law of the country' and appeal
to custom. In the Maji area, the leaders of the Suri, Dizi and Me'en,
while reduced in stature, remained in place.
The Dizi
The Dizi are an old sedentary agricultural society, formerly a
conglomerate of about twenty independent but related territorial
chiefdoms, with their own political leaders (among them, Adikyaz,
188
Jeba, Sai, Gobi, Dami, Maji, Mui, Or and Kolu, all existing
simultaneously). The chiefs were war leaders and frequently fought for
primacy of control over people and land. There was also a hierarchy
between the ehiefdorns, with Adikyaz, Jeba, Gobi, Maji Or and Kolu
the most important.
Dizi society had a cqmplex system of hierarchical titles or social
ranks, from kyaz and burji down to geyma (see Haberland 1993), which
is still maintained although exprèssed predomin^ntly in the domain of
ritual and dietary rules (Deguchi 1996). Chiefs, for instance, can never
be served drinks from the same bowl as commoners, cannot sit on the
same bench and have to observe food taboos. In bergu seeli - the
yearly harvest initiation «ritual - the chief figures in a prescribed rôle
play with lower ranked ritual assistants. Dizi chiefs and their closely
guarded ritual insigriia (inherited beads and bracelets, ritual spears, an
ivory trumpet, a brass phallic forehead ornament, etc.) which could not
be touched, sometimes not even be seen, by commoners. The chiefs
were rain masters and ritual initiators of the agricultural cycle. They
were also mediators in disputes, often imposing a décision and
punishing or fining people. 'They were not 'divine kings' (as among the
Maale; see Donham 1994, 1999) but had a sacrality and a charisma
deemed inherent in the function itself, becaüse it was grounded
supernaturally and inherited from the kin line of their ancestors. A
strong chiefs successor<was selected from among his male off-spring
to 'reproduce' that charisma. Many of these ûhiefly functions are still
recognized, although political and fighting power are gone. While the
father of the present chief of Adikyaz12 was recognized by Emperor
Haile Selassie *as a local balabbat ('chief) and given the honorific
Amharic title ofßtawrari, he had few administrative or other political
functions to play despite his remaining an authoritative ritual chief for
the local Dizi. s ^ -
The most important feature of Ethiopian rule in Dizi was,
however,* economie: the introduction of the gabbar system which made
the local population into labour serfs to the northerners and undermined
their local economy. In Dizi, the system was particularly exploitative
(Haberland 1993, 11-13) and led to dépopulation,^ humiliation and
po'verty. Some chiefs, like the JVlaji kuri, profitted from this system
(Garretson 1986/217) only to be discarded later on.1'1 Most chiefs were
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side-tracked, and their rôle in Dizi society changed. From powerful
redistributive chiefs they became more like commoners. While social
distance in Dizi society diminished, they tried tö défend local people
from the newcomers' onslaught, although unable tö prevent the décline.
The Dizi chiefs of today are still leaders and important local figures
with gréât prestige, but they hâve no political rôle in thé administrative
structure. When compared to thé Suri and Me'en, thé Dizi chiefs seem
to have made the deepest fall frorn power and prestige in the course of
their confrontation with northern settlers and the state.
The Suri
•}
The Suri (called Surma by outsiders) are a segmentary society of
transhumant cattle herders and cultivators with a high degree of
egalitarialism and individualism. Unlike the Dizi, they are organized in
patrilineal clans. Their ritual leaders, called komoru, are '<first among
equals' and have no political functions whatsoever. They are priest-like
figures with ritual authority and a mediatory rôle, although their
position of authority has supernatural aspects. They have a quality
known as bariri, being 'hot' or 'dangerous', which is said to dérive
from their being in touch with God and the sky. This quality provides a
kind of institutional charisma, reproduced in the descent line of the clan
to which h? belongs. There is also a more secular type of 'headman'
among the Suri: the gulsa, who is a territorial or village leader.
Although he is not 'appointed' by the komoru but elected by the local
people, hè holds his authority as représentative of the komoru, who
gives him Ws blessing. A gulsa has neither ritual compétence like the
komoru nor supernatural aura, but he must maintain law and order in
the latter's name
There are indications in Suri oral tradition that in the past the
komorus were more powerful as war leaders, but this function may
have been reduced sinee Ethiopian rule was established around 1900. It
is now limited Jo performing blessing rituals for warriors on the eve of
a raid or campaign, and hè is not involved in actual fïghting or given
commands.
After the incorporation of the Southwest, the Ethiopian state
officials had tróiibje In identifying 'feàders' among the Suri. The three
komorus (two among the Tirrfiaga sub-group and one among the Chai
190
sub-group) were not executive leaders whose orders woüld be followed
by ordinary Suri. Thus, for them, the balabbat and the chiga-shum
positions were largely irrelevant. * - <
The government never succeeded in effeclively involving this
'nomadic groups' (like the Suri) in the administration. It contented
itself with maintaining contacts with what it saw as traditional leaders
or spokesmen necessary to keep local peace, start médiation în disputes
with farmers and get taxes. The northerners never understood the age-
group organization of Suri society, which gave more authority to a
collective âge group of elders (called r>ora) than to the komorus.
Nevertheless, in the late 1920s the Chai komoru Dolloté III, also known
as Wolekibo, was recognized as a Community chief and called
balabbat, but his contact with the Ethiopian state représentatives was
very limited. The Suri were basically left alone, and were difficult to
control anyhow in the vast, hot lowland area southwest of Maji.
In the Italian period (1936-1941), the old leadership structure in
the Maji area was replaced. The Italians presented themselves as
liberators, as they removed the pressure of the gäbbar regime of
northerners on the Dizi and Me'en. Raiding for slaves and cattle was
indeed contained, and Italian military administrators took over from
Ethiopian ones. Several army posts were established in the area.
The Me 'en
The impact of impérial rule on the third and largest group, the Me 'en
(called Tishana by the northern immigrants), was more mixed. The
Me'en, a people culturally and linguistically related to the Suri, did not
live in a remote border area but in a forested highland région east and
west of Maji town. Many of them settled there in the same period that
the northern Ethiopians arrived (early twentieth Century). The Me'en
were a highly mobile and expanding people, not organized in
chiefdoms but in territorial groups under clan leaders and rain chiefs
(called komorut). Their age organization has disappeared. Me'en
economy was mixed, with cattle herding, shifting.cultivation and
hunting and garnering. The komoruts were similar in function to those
of the Suri, and did not lead the armed résistance against the
northerners. None of the five traditional komoruts ever took up the
position of government chief; only some of their subordinate 'village
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chiefs' (bizingif) did so as chiqashums.
Throughout the period of consolidation of imperia! rule in Maji,
the Tishana-Me'en revolted against the efforts to include them into the
gabbar system. In this they largely succeeded, although at a price. In
this process of armed rébellion, a new type of territorial leader called
menda-buyto (lit. 'big men') with an 'achieved charisma' emerged.
They did not rise from the ranks of the komoruts, but had their blessing.
Among the Me'en, therefore, we saw the rise of a new form of
chieftaincy, legitimized by values of collective self-defence and
territorial unity as above clan identity.
In the later decades of the imperia! era, many Me'en, becoming
more sedentary, came to accept a closer link with the state
administration and some of their self-made leaders became balabbats.
However, the Me'en komoruts (among them Boshu, the most
important) living in the remote lowlands remained aloof from the state.
They kept their prestigieus position as normative ritual heads of the
Me'en, but lost their effective influence outside their own area of
seulement. They receded into a position of non-pol itical headmen.
In the post-War years, after Emperor Haile Selassie's return from
exile in 1941, a gréât effort was taken to (re)establish state control over
the country. As part of this, a big chiefs' conference for the southern
régions was convened in the provincial capital of Jimma in 1951. The
Emperor had invited the chiefs of all the various régions and groups of
the South. Several Me'en représentatives also went there, a journey of
one week on foot.14 The meeting was a consultative one, called to
request loyalty of the various local leaders and chiefs and unity ,of
purpose in developing the nation. It was not so much aimed to set a
concrete agenda for change, except that it confirmed the abolition of
the gabbar system. Some of the Maji leaders were recognized as
balabbats and received an honorific Ethiopian title, such asfltawrari,
kenyazmqch or grazmach. But after their return, politica! authority
remained in the hands of the emperor's administrative appointées.
An Important'resuit of the confrontation between impérial power
and loóal chiefs and leaders was that ideas of governance and authority
gradually changéd among the local population: they saw that power and
leadership were enforced by the brute use of force by the northerners,
>
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that the Christianity they brought was a 'more powerful' faith and that
the power of the Dizi chiefs was based on economie and politica!
domination. Stories from commoner informants suggest that the chiefs'
demands were no longer accepted uncritically after their loss of power
since the conquest. The 'arts of résistance' were practised more openly.
They recognized the 'constructedness' of leadership. But the cultural
premises of legitimacy and social order, for which the ritual activities
of chiefs were necessary, were not rejected, especially among the Suri
and the Me'en. However, these cultural premises were exposed to wear
and tear. This would become more evident in the period of the
Revolution since 1974.
Cadres and chiefs: 'revolutionary' governance on the local level
In 1974, the imperia! regime crumbled after a révolution initiated in
Addis Ababa. The emperor responded neither to the demands of the
restless urban population in a period of socio-economic crisis nor tu the
mutiny of a group of rebellious army officers, and a process of démise
set in. In September 1974, a military counci! (Derg) was in place and
became the centre of power. It radicalized under the influence of a
faction led by Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam who became undisputed
head of state in February 1977 after eliminating his rivais. A period of
totalitarian and violent state socialism began which would transform
the country and deeply traumatize Ethiopian society (For a survey, see
Donham 1999, 13-36, 122:50; Abbink 1995; Andargachew 1993).
This Ethiopian-Marxist version of modernity (as a programme of
development and as an attitude of rejecting the past and of orientation
towards the future) began with a concerted effort by the-new .regime to
reform the social order and propcrty relations, Several aspects are
important here. First, the,national ization of all land and the dismantling
of the landed aristocracy. This happened after the 1975 Land
Proclamation, nationalizing all land. A huge 'educational campaign'
(called a zamatchd) against the «ld order was launched in the same year
to be carried out by ,urban students sent out to the countryside to teach
peasants socialist values, dislodge all 'landlords' and make a start with
collectivist-socialist agriculture. Most peasants^ especially those in the
south, welcomed their new access to land, but the overall results.of this
campaign were disastrous. In northern Ethiopia where; peasants already
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equivalent to their own rora elders and komorus with which to deal on
an equal basis. This skepticism remained vis-à-vis all subséquent local
administrators, who formally included the Suri area into newly formed
peasant associations ruled from the highland villages but did not have
much impact there.
Among the Me'en, the revolutionaries identified the clan leaders
and new territorial chiefs (often sons of the former war leaders who had
resisted the northern settlers) and accused them as balabbats. Several of
them, for instance Adabalcha, the chief of the Bayti Me'en, were put in
prison, humiliated, forced to break food taboos and robbed of chiefly
symbols. Others did not wait for their own arrest and fled to forest
areas, to remote lowlands or to Sudan. The revolutionaries also targeted
another type of Me'en leaders: the spirit mediums, who acted as
traditional healers and diviners and had an important function of social
control in Me'en society. They were labelled as 'impostors' by the
cadres and were forbidden to practice their arts or to accept livestock
and other gifts as payment. Some continued their work in secret; some
were forced to flee to the areas out of reach of government agents.
Internai division in Me'en society increased when local people
were sought out to become cadres, as they spoke thé local language and
'knew the culture'. Some of these were young Me'en who had lived in
Amhara families; others were products of the mission school. Several
sons of the traditional rural elite, whether northerners or of indigenous
ethnie groups, also became cadres for the revolutionary government.
In June 1977, three years after the révolution, the Me'en allied
themselves with other disaffected people from the Bench and Suri
people and staged an armed revolt against the revolutionary activists
and the northerners, attacking eight highland villages.15 The attack was
coordinated by the Me'en leaders and relatives of people previously
arrested and dishonoured. A two-day battle followed,- and dozens of
Me'en and villagers were killed. On the eve of the third day,
reinforcements from the provincial capital were sent and the attackers
were beaten back. The villages of Ch'ebera, Barda, Tui and Gesha were
abandoned after the attack and the last three of them were completely
destroyed. About a week after the first attack, the rébellion came to an
end, and a revenge action of the Ethiopian arrny began, tracking down
leaders, especially lowland Me'en and the families of the clan leaders,
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rain chiefs and spirit mediums, which they saw as the root of the unrest.
A contingent of well-armed government soldiers and policemen carried
out a three-week punitive expédition across the Me'en area: lumdreds
of livestock and other possession were confiscated and huts burned.
The result of the suppression of the revolt was that several Me'en
went into hiding in inaccessible forest areas or lowlands. This occurred
at a time when in the urban centre of the country the 'Red Terror', a
bloody political persécution of Derg opponents, raged in füll force. Of
this the Me'en were certainly aware. Among the fugitives were all
important Me'en territorial leaders, like Bilemu, Juga Ngorbok,
Gelejba, Shaya, Kwomoda and Gauli (some of them komorut, clan
leader or spirit medium). Invitations by the administration to fugitive
chiefs to come out and negotiate were not heeded after two leaders (a
Bench and a Me'en) who had naïvely done this were executed. Most of
them, therefore stayed away for many years.'6
For the Dizi, the effects of the révolution period and the zamatcha
were also dramatic. Their chiefs and social order were the issue of a big
assault on their legitimacy and even their life. In fact, there was an
attempt to eliminate the entire class of hereditary chiefs and ritual
insignia and objects confiscated and destroyed. As the Dizi were a
sedentary group in a compact area they were easily targeted by the
revolutionaries. They did not have the power to muster armed revolt,
and had no 'escape routes' like the Me'en and the Suri. Only the Jeba-
burji, chiefs of the most isolated western chiefdom of Dizi close to the
lowlands, went into exile, coming back only after the fall of the Derg in
1991. Among the Dizi, there is thus a tragic record of dévastation and
public humiliation of chiefs. But the Dizi chiefs did not die out; they
survived in the margins, keeping a low profile.
As noted in an earlier study:
In its radical modernisation drive,1 the Derg succeeded,
more than Haile Sellassie ever did, in removing these
traditional chiefs from the political arena, replacing
them with peasant-association chairmen, a new style of
politicized and dependent local leadership. Headmen
and chiefs retreated to the cultural domain, where their
survival was deemed harmless (Abbink 1997, 65).
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The 'revolutionary approach' of the Derg government, by
grounding itself in a négation of the socio-cultural order of local
societies, produced a serious rupture in patterns of leadership and
authority. It prevented local people from combining their traditional
cultural commitments with new ideas and practices of development and
administrative reform. It crèated a revolutionary bureaucratie command
structure that became the conduit of totalitarian policy, bypassing local
needs and sensibilities. On top ofthat, in economie terms the Derg time
was a period of décline, which had made even the observance of local
ceremonies and customs very precarious.
The 'Ethno-Federal' State:
Continuity and Change
Under the EPRDF regime in place since May 1991, another radical
transformation of Ethiopian politics took place. The core of this regime
was formed by the ethno-regional insurgent movement — Tigray
People's Liberation Front.17 It extended the ethnie rights ideology to all
the other groups of the country but kept the reigns of central power in
its own hands. The Derg state structure was dismantled and a new
'revolutionary democracy' based on democratie centralism and a
formai récognition of the rights of the 'nations, nationalities and
peoples' of Ethiopia was announced. Thus 'ethnie tradition' was again
recognized, against past 'Amhara domination and suppression',18 All
previous administrators were removed in the name of this
'revolutionary ideology', even if they had been politically neutral and
had a good record.
A typical example was the présentation given by an EPRDF group
at a meeting in the Me'en area on 20 July 1991, which I witnessed.
They had come to oversee élections for a new local council and to give
an explanation of the new revolutionary ideology: the oppressive
regime of the Derg regime and of 'the Amhara' had ended and 'from
now on all nations and nationalities of Ethiopia would be treated
equally'. 'Self-government of the local people' would be developed by
the EPRDF. Also a new party (under EPRDF) for people from the local
'nationalities' would be established, and all were encouraged to join
and claim freedom.
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But while local 'ethnie leaders', often very young men, were now
selected as formal heads of the peasant associations and village
councils, they were co-opted into a structure of 'shadow rule' by the
dominant party EPRDF. This might have some educational purpose in
the years of transition, but it meant that behind these local
représentatives the party put its own people to supervise and rule. This
effectively meant limiting local ethnie représentation and organization,
because all important décisions were taken by these shadow people.
Furthermore, EPRDF rule consolidated the side-lining of all indigenous
leaders. There were limits to the stated aim of 'promoting the local
cultures', etc. Spirit mediums, descendants of komoruts and clan
leaders had no place in the new order. The idea was to create a whole
new stratum of only young people as local leaders in the peasant
associations and local councils. They were supposed to make a fresh
start and to administer the newly crèated ethnie districts (called
\voredd) of Suri, Dizi and Me'en. The new administrative System
imposed by the central government did not consider a rôle for the
génération of elders, chiefs and the komorus, although they were
recognised as having some influence in every-day life.
We saw above that the Derg government was a fundamental
break, because of its radical delegitimization of indigenous leadership
and its rule of violence beyond anything that the impérial regime had
done, and because of its destruction of the fabric of political culture
with its accommodative and trans-ethnic médiation mechanisms. But
there seems to be continuity between Derg and EPRDF in their ideas
on revolutionary social change, dislodging of elites, state ownership of
all land, modernist development models, and also Marxist-Leninist
organizational structures. In addition, the héritage and symbolism of
violence as a politica! means is still present and played upon under the
EPRDF regime (Abbink, 1995).
In the southern countryside, the new regime did not aim to
reconnect with legitimate grassroots leaders or try to understand local
views on authority and governance.19 What is clear from the two phases
of revolutionary government as they impacted on the local groups in
Maji is that the new state agents (both from Derg and EPRDF) acted on
the assumption that the cultural domain of traditional leadership was
invalidated and refuted: for them, there was of course no such thing as
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a 'sacred chief or a 'divine king', no ritual power over growth and
fertility of animais, crops and peopie, and no 'control over ram' With
the simple and categorical rejection of this meaningful symbohc
universe, the cadres and the government peopie expected that all
'traditional culture' (including 'harmful customs') would go, and that
political authority would simply be vested in a 'rational bureaucratie'
structure. There would be no place for ethnie ór cultural 'content', nor
even for a graduai 'translation' into forms of rule and dialogue that
would find résonance with local peopie. While thé cosmological or
truth claims as to thé causal relations between ritual activity and natural
phenomena are thé issue of debâte also among thé local peopie, what
they wish is an efficient and dignified consultative model of
governance, a new structure of responsive reciprocity, so to speak. This
lias not been developed. Thus the legitimacy of state rule will be
contested.
Even though' indigenous leaders like Suri and Me'en komorus or
clan leaders and Dizi chiefs will continue to be active in their own
'ethnie polity' as respected figureheads and référence points of internai
peace and dispute médiation, they cannot but lose their prestige and
rôle even further as thé new leadership gains a foothold and also as
internai divisions increase. For example, there were dramatic internai
changes in Suri and Me'en society over the past decades, especially an
escalation of inter-group violence and increased resource pressure (cf.
Abbink, 2000), leading to weakening of the rôle of the komorus.20
It is ironie that the process of incorporation of local leaders and
ethnie polities in Ethiopia is being impiemented by mean& of a
discourse of culture and ethnie autonomy - denied in the days of the
emperor and ignored in those of the Derg - while at the same time the
administrative context and ingrained political practices of governance
make the actual substance and symbolism of that ethno-cultural
tradition irrelevant. Thus, the political co-optation of ethnicity and local
chieftaincy seems to be complete.
Reconnecting the Local and the National in Globalizing Conditions
In Ethiopia, local indigenous leaders and chiefs have never been a
political force as important as in other African countries, like for
instance Ghana (see Rathbone 2000) or Nigeria (Vaughan 2000). The
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lóng-established Ethiopian political tradition of centralized government
as wel! as the absence of a pervasive colonial System of indirect rule
were some of the reasons for this.
This means that the Ethiopian case goes against a dominant trend
in the literature asserting that chieftaincy is a tradition that was
'created' and 'imposed' on African societies. In the, case of southem
Ethiopia this would be a particularJy unhistorical argument,
notwithstanding the fact that leadership and authority positions
underwent significant changes while confronting impérial and
revolutionary rule.
Chiefs and headmen in the three societies discussed were bypassed
and condoned in non-essential social and ritual functions. Their rôle
within their own societies diminished, as the scope of their activities
was limited by force. The state and its agents embarked upon the
establishment of the monopoly of violence, the imposition of a tax
regime and the genera! redirection of flows of local material resources
(land, labour, and produce) to state-controlled elite channeis, thus
establishing the hegemony of a new secular bureaucracy. But the
legitimacy of chiefs and leaders did not evaporate, not even among the
hierarchical Dizi, where chiefs in objective terms were economically a
bürden for commoners, but where their demands and actions had
customary limits of symbolic reciprocity, beyond which legitimacy
revolt would follow. The local cultural universe was subverted but was
not successfully replaced by the ideological regime of the revolutionary
state.
Nowadays, a cautious re-evaluation of forms of tradition-oriented
governance on the local level is in progress. Peopie are not 'going back
to the past', but rediscovering principles of traditional legitirnacy that
metaphorically relate the political process in some kind of natural or
cosmic order (an indigenous view of sustainability, so to speak), codify
reciprocity and express people's daily concerns centered on peace, rain,
fertility, reproduction and earning a living.21 Despite the revolutionary
onslaught, for many local peopie in the Maji area it has not been proven
that traditional leaders, be they chiefs or rain mediators or former
balabbats, are only oppressors and exploiters that brought a downturn
in their fortunes, as always asserted by the revolutionary authorities of
the Derg or EPRDF. On the contrary, peopie now tend to blâme the
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central state and its 'cadres' for unthinkingly undermining the old order
in dramatic movements of agitation and change, and for disturbing pre-
existing médiation mechanisms for solving disputes and conflict
without replacing them with an effective state judicial structure. In such
comments, local people pointed not only to their increased economie
hardships, but also to the destruction of their cultural order. Their
distrust of state political agents and their policies of violence and war
(the civil war before 1991 and the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea),
colleciivization and political control seems greater than ever. In
contrast to the chiefs, these politicians and state cadres were not
accountable to them but only to the higher authorities in the far-away
capital.
Local people also become more aware of the global discourse of
democracy and human rights. Even the Ethiopian constitution of 1994
announced a host of such rights, including third-generation collective
rights. But people see them flouted ahnost everyday by a state failing to
deliver, and they reconsider the rights and duties underthe 'indigenous'
regime of their leaders and following their own cultural assumptions. It
is, for instance, remarkable how all across the multi ethnie South, the
respect for traditional religious and political leaders resurged after the
fall of the Derg regime in May 1991 (see Donham 1999, 183; Olmstead
1997, 212): people want to reconnect and re-establish continuity and
meaning.
In present-day Ethiopia, there seems to be a need for a new model
of vertical political communication in the true sense of the word.
Certainly on the local level, there is still no working democratie
structure of political parties, voting for alternation of political leaders or
a judicial System accessible for all and free from bias and bribes. Local
leaders or chiefs can fuifiii a roie here, especiaily if they get more
récognition and, perhaps, more training, and could develop mutual lines
of communication (now completely absent). The policy of ignoring
them and relying only on young people who are malléable and
susceptible to the ideology and policies of the reigning party is not
always productive. Décentraiization and self-rule models can make
better use of local leaders, as examples elsewhere in Africa have amply
demonstrated. An important starting point would be to recognize the
rôle of adjudication and médiation that the remaining chiefs still have
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in every-day life, following local représentations and j ideas of
legitimate authority. The elitist and neo-patrimonial political system in
place may prevent the rapid development of such more effective lines
of political communication, but it is certain that créative reconnections
between local-level everyday politics and the wider national arena of
the state are sorely needed.
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Notes
1. And elsewhere. See the revealing study of M. Herzfeld (1992) on
European bureaucracy.
2. In the highland areas of the historie Ethiopian state (Begemdir, Gojjam,
Tigray, Wollo, Shewa) as well as in Oromo-speaking areas (Wollega,
lüubabor) since the mid-nineteenth Century there were serni-independent
provincial kings who recognized the nominal sovereignty of the emperor
and paid tribute but in practice enjoyed much autonomy. The problem of
how to deal with indigenous leaders and customary law became acute
after the gréât southward expansion of the Ethiopian state since ca, 1880.
3. This was the Ethiopian shum-shir principle: to (unpredictably) appoint
and demote.
4. E.g., after the conquest of the rebellions Wolayta kingdom in 1894 by
emperor Menilik II, its king T'ona was taken prisoner and exiled, but his
203
grandson Ato Fisseha Desta later became the regional administrator of
the Wolayta région.
5 While Emperor Haile Sellassie (r. 1930-1974) created most of Ethiopia's
modern institutions, initiated a large-scale codification of law and
organized an électoral System, he did not intend to liberalize Ethiopia's
political system in a significant way. Neither did he succeed in creating a
more just system of land distribution.
6. See Abbink 1997a; Cayla 1997; Assefaw 1998.
7. For Dizi chiefs to eat sorghum (a Dizi staple food) was a serious taboo.
8. With thé exception of Eritrea, deeply affected by Italian colonialism firom
1890 to 1941.
9. There were also others. See Berhane 1969 (p. 40-41).
10. There are no traditions of female chieftaincy, but occasionally females
stepped in to take the chiefly position. For a fascinating study of a
remarkable female chief among the Dita people in the Gamo area of
Ethiopia, see Olmstead 1997.
11. This also applies to the a-typical inter-regnum of Abeto lyasu, an
uncrowned king of Ethiopia (1913-16) removed by force?
12. See Photo l in Haberland 1993 (following p. 32). This chief died in
1970
13. The descendants of the Maji kuri are now few in number and very
impoverished. None of them has any position of authority. This chiefly
line was probably delegitimized by their close collaboration with the
northern overlords, and in the 1990s the candidate to fill the post has
even refused to take it up. See Abeje 1999:42.
14. One of the Me'en leaders attending was B'asagala Galt'ach, the leader of
the Selakoroi clan, who recalled this event with pride in an interview in
1990. Some Dizi chiefs also attended. But from the Suri nobody came.
15. This passage is based on Abbink 1994: 747^48.
16. Of other leading families, such as the Shaya and the Bilemu, who were
from old komoru lines and highly respected by the Me'en, several young
members were arrested and killed. In the Shaya family, only one brother
of four was left. After the disappearance of his brothers, the heir never set
foot in the villages (domain of the government authorities).
17. For a genera! study of this movement, see Young, 1999.
18. This was a very simplified formula, because dominance was not on a
purely ethnie basis, let alone only by Amhara.
19. Indeed, even in the new democratie structures that were hesitatingly put
place after 1991, the independent or opposition party electedin
représentatives were not accepted. For instance, after the 2000 national
élections, these people and their supporters were even actively persecuted
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and intimidated. (See Tronvoll 2001, forthcoming) Local populations are
therefore becoming wary of involvement in state politics.
20 Some years ago, one of the Suri komorus was killed by a fellow Suri (a
male agnate), which meant a very serious breach of Suri custom. Since
then, this territorial section of the Suri has been in disarray. But the
komoru institution jtself is not discarded.
21. They also keep relying on éléments of indjgenous traditions relating to
knowledge of the natural environment, forms of oral tradition, public
discourse and narrative traditions on thé history and généalogies of their
people and, in thé case of Suri and some Me'en, of cattlé.
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